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I. INTRODUCTION 
Let me begin with an experience.1 
It was not the judge himself who asked me for a campaign 
contribution to support his reelection. Instead, a prominent attorney 
made the request, although we were clearly in the sight of the judge 
himself. I remember thinking that the judge might not recognize me: 
not only was I a relatively new lawyer in this community but we were 
at the annual Halloween party hosted by this prominent attorney. I 
regretted that my costume did not include a mask or a beard. 
 
 *  Professor of Law and University Distinguished Professor, City University of New York 
(CUNY) School of Law.  My thanks to the editors and staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review for 
their excellent work, to Kara Wallis, CUNY School of Law Class of 2015 for preliminary 
research, and to Sarah Valentine for support.  
 1.  While I am well aware there are problems with experience in legal scholarship, 
Ruthann Robson, Beginning from (My) Experience: The Paradoxes of Lesbian/Queer 
Narrativities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1391–1394 (1997), and also want to make clear that my 
use of dialogue is a narrative device rather than accurate recollection, I do think it is noteworthy 
that I recall this event decades later.   
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“Is that legal?” I asked the attorney. 
“Perfectly.” 
“I mean, I have some cases in front of him.” 
“All the more reason to contribute.” 
“Let me think about it,” I stalled. 
I do not recall whether or not I ultimately contributed. But I do 
recall that every time I appeared before this judge in my role as an 
attorney with Florida Rural Legal Services, I thought about the 
Halloween party. I thought about it every time I lost and every time I 
won, even when the issue was small. I thought about my clients, by 
definition living below the poverty line, and wondered if I should use 
some of my salary on their behalf. I wondered whether my opposing 
counsel had contributed to the judge’s campaign. And how much. 
In speaking with fellow members of The Florida Bar about this 
when it occurred, in 1982 or so, they suggested I was squeamish. One 
of my former classmates who was now in private practice informed me 
that this was the way the game was “played.” He contended that this 
judge was known as “liberal” and that would be good for my clients. 
He also told me to “get real,” insinuating that I was naïve because of 
my post-graduate clerkships with federal judges. “State judges are 
elected,” he reminded me. When I asked about his law firm’s 
contributions, he boasted that the firm always contributed in every 
election, and to every candidate. And he mentioned what seemed to 
me to be a staggering sum. 
The ethical rule that governed a judicial candidate’s solicitation 
of funds from attorneys or others in 19822 is substantially similar to 
the present rule, Canon 7C(1),3 the provision at issue in Williams-
 
 2.  Canon 7B(2), adopted in 1973 (and effective until 1995), provided: 
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public 
election between competing candidates should not himself solicit campaign funds, or 
solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of 
responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign 
and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not 
prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from any person 
or corporation authorized by law. A candidate's committees may solicit funds for his 
campaign only within the time limitation provided by law. A candidate should not use 
or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or 
members of his family. 
In re The Fla. Bar—Code of Judicial Conduct, 281 So. 2d 21, 32 (Fla. 1973) (mem.) (per curiam). 
 3.  Canon 7C(1), effective January 1, 1995, and not altered since then, provides: 
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public 
election between competing candidates shall not personally solicit campaign funds, or 
solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but may establish committees of 
responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate's 
campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his or her candidacy. Such 
committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public 
support from any person or corporation authorized by law. A candidate should not 
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Yulee v. The Florida Bar.4 Lanell Williams-Yulee admittedly wrote 
and signed a letter directly soliciting funds to support her quest to 
become a county court judge.5 In the state proceedings, before the 
referee, and before the Supreme Court of Florida, she argued that she 
did not—or did not intend to—violate Canon 7C(1) because there was 
no “competing candidate” as required by the Canon. She also argued 
that Canon 7C(1) violated the First Amendment. The referee and 
Supreme Court of Florida rejected both these arguments and found 
her guilty of professional misconduct, although the punishment was 
the relatively modest one of “public reprimand.”6 
In this Essay, I do not abandon my decades-old 
“squeamishness.” Instead, I argue the Court should recognize the 
interests of practicing lawyers—with special attention to public 
 
expend funds in furtherance of his or her judicial campaign or establish a committee 
to solicit contributions or public support earlier than one year before the general 
election. A candidate shall not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the 
private benefit of the candidate or members of the candidate's family. 
In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So.2d 1037, 1059–60 (Fla. 1994) (mem.).  
 4.  Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 138 So. 3d 379 (Fla.), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 44, 
(2014). 




I have served as a public servant for this community as Public Defender as well as a 
Prosecutor for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such 
as “The Great American Teach In,” Inns Of Court, Pro Bono Attorney, Metropolitan 
Ministries outreach program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women 
residing within Hillsborough County, I have long worked for positive change in 
Tampa. With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to 
seek elected office. I want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Judicial 
bench. I am certain that I can uphold the Laws, Statutes, Ordinances as prescribed by 
the Constitution Of the State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United 
States Of America. 
I am confident that I can serve as a positive attribute to the Thirteenth Judicial 
Circuit by running for County Court Judge, Group 10. To succeed in this effort, I need 
to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting the people that know me best to join 
my campaign and help make a real difference. An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, 
$250, or $500, made payable to “Lanell Williams-Yulee Campaign for County Judge”, 
will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get our message 
out to the public. I ask for your support In meeting the primary election fund raiser 
goals. Thank you in advance for your support. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ 
Lanell Williams-Yulee, Esq. 
Political Advertisement paid for and approved by Lanell Williams-Yulee, 
Nonpartisan, for County Judge, Group 10 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 31a–32a, Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 138 So.3d 379 
(No. 13-1499) (June 17, 2014), 2014 WL 2769040. 
 6. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d at 381. 
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interest and social justice attorneys—in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida 
Bar. The recognition of such interests are especially important in this 
case because Ms. Williams-Yulee’s status as a public defender and 
thus member of the public interest bar has the potential to obscure the 
negative effects that a ruling in her favor will have on the larger social 
justice bar. Moreover, while the Supreme Court of Florida did 
conclude there were “compelling interests in preserving the integrity 
of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an 
impartial judiciary,”7 the interests of the public and the practicing bar 
in judicial integrity are distinct, if related. Most often, the “public” 
interacts with the courts through attorneys. As attorneys, our 
professional and personal lives can be intertwined with judges’ lives, 
and we may have been judges or aspire to be judges ourselves. More 
importantly, the actions of the judiciary implicate our own 
professionalism, ethics, and careers. 
From the perspective of public interest lawyering, this “first 
look” Essay argues that four decisions are worth a “second look” when 
the Court considers Williams-Yulee. The next Parts of this Essay 
discuss these four opinions in turn, in order from the most obvious to 
least obvious.8 
II. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE9 
If the applicable precedent in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida 
Bar could be reduced to a single case, it would be the United States 
Supreme Court’s closely divided 2002 decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White. In White, the Court held that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s “canon of judicial conduct prohibiting candidates for 
judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal and 
political issues violates the First Amendment.”10 Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court holding the so-called “announce clause” 
unconstitutional was augmented by Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion, which essentially argued that Minnesota, like other states 
that selected judges through election, had only itself to blame.11 As the 
 
 7.  Id. at 381. 
      8.      Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); In re Hawkins, No. SC12–
2495, 2014 WL 5470745 (Fla. Oct. 30, 2014), reh'g denied (Nov. 26, 2014). 
 9.  536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 10.  Id. at 788.  
 11.  Id. (O’Connor., J. concurring). Since her retirement from the Court, Justice O’Connor 
has been promoting state court merit selection rather than elections. See, e.g., Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/opinion/23oconnor.html. In White, Justice Kennedy also 
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final sentence of O’Connor’s concurrence phrases it, “If the State has a 
problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought 
upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.”12 
This notion—that once the state allows judicial elections it cannot 
constitutionally regulate them any differently than it regulates other 
elections—is at the heart of Williams-Yulee. As the petition for 
certiorari for Williams-Yulee argued, the state “cannot have it both 
ways.”13 
Yet this dichotomy is a false one, for it rests upon the 
indistinguishability of judicial and political elections, as well as on the 
equivalency of judicial and political roles to be assumed after a 
successful election. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in White and joined 
by three other Justices,14 observed that while Justice O’Connor may be 
correct that there is a “fundamental tension” between “the ideal 
character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral 
politics,”15 it is not the Court’s role to resolve that tension 
by forcing States to choose one pole or the other. Judges are not politicians, and the 
First Amendment does not require that they be treated as politicians simply because 
they are chosen by popular vote. Nor does the First Amendment command States that 
wish to promote the integrity of their judges in fact and appearance to abandon systems 
of judicial selection that the people, in the exercise of their sovereign prerogatives, have 
devised.16 
Republican Party v. White deserves a second look by the Court, 
because it is a closely divided opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
remains cogent. 
Moreover, the Court should be wary of simply equating the 
position statements at issue in White with the solicitation for funds 
before the Court in Williams-Yulee. Despite the Court’s closely divided 
but robust recognition of money as highly protected political speech in 
 
issued a separate concurring opinion. See White, 536 U.S. at 792–796. Kennedy’s opinion argued 
for a categorical approach, stating that “content-based speech restrictions that do not fall within 
any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tailoring or 
compelling government interests.” Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 12.  White, 536 U.S. at 792. 
      13.    Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 31a–32a, Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 138 
So.3d 379 (No. 13-1499) (June 17, 2014), 2014 WL 2769040 (citing and quoting Geary v. Renne, 
911 F.2d 280, 294 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)). 
 14.  White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Ginsburg’s dissent was joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Stevens also issued a dissenting opinion, also 
joined by the three other dissenters. 
 15.  Id. at 821. As Justice Ginsburg stated, the “Court has recognized in the past, as Justice 
O’Connor does today,” a “fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office 
and the real world of electoral politics.” Id. (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991)).    
 16.  Id.   
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the campaign finance cases,17 an extension of White—and it would be 
an extension—to the solicitations for campaign contributions involved 
in Williams-Yulee would have a disproportionately negative impact on 
the public interest bar. Simply put: lawyers practicing public interest 
and lawyers practicing more lucrative types of law are simply not 
similarly situated in the area of campaign contributions as distinct 
from assessing a judicial candidate’s statements and reputation. While 
Canon 7C(1) does not prohibit campaign contributions, it does govern 
a judicial candidate’s solicitation of these funds, including direct 
communication with an attorney. It also implicates judicial integrity 
as related to financial interests in a way that has previously troubled 
the Court. 
III. CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.18 
Applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment rather than the First Amendment at issue in Williams-
Yulee and White, a closely-divided Court in Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co. found that the failure of Brent Benjamin, a recently-elected 
justice on West Virginia’s highest court, to recuse himself in a matter 
involving his major campaign donor19 was unconstitutional. The 
contributor, Don Blankenship, was Massey Coal Company’s chairman, 
executive officer, and president, and a prominent figure in West 
Virginia, who has since been indicted for his business practices.20 
In finding the due process violation, the Court’s opinion, 
authored by Justice Kennedy, stressed that not every “campaign 
contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that 
requires a judge’s recusal.”21 The Court described the facts in Caperton 
as “extreme by any measure,”22 and the case as “exceptional,”23 
although perhaps the situation is not as unique as that language 
implies.24 The Court concluded that “there is a serious risk of actual 
 
 17.  See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Ariz. Free Enterprise Club's 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 18.  556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 19.  “Blankenship’s $3 million in contributions were more than the total amount spent by 
all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s own committee.” 
Id. at 873.  
 20. Indictment, U.S. v. Blankenship, No. 514-CC-00244 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 13, 2014), 
available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1373174/donald-
blankenship-indictment.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/S5KB-6H8Q. 
 21.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884. 
      22.     Id. at 887. 
      23.     Id. at 884. 
 24.  See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008) (based on a Mississippi judicial election). 
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bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person 
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising 
funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was 
pending or imminent.”25 
The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Roberts critiques this 
rule as “opening the door” to due process claims with an “amorphous 
‘probability of bias’ ” that will themselves essentially undermine 
judicial impartiality.26 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion contains a list of 
forty questions that the Court leaves unanswered, including some that 
focus on lawyers: Does it matter whether the campaign contributions 
are from a party or a party’s attorney, and if “from a lawyer, must the 
judge recuse in every case involving that attorney?” And in the Court’s 
“objective” test for bias, is the relevant lens that of “a reasonable 
person, a reasonable lawyer, or a reasonable judge?”27 
These are genuine concerns, but they also reinforce the Court’s 
reminder that due process constrains only the “outer boundaries” of 
judicial conduct. Instead, states “remain free to impose more rigorous 
standards.”28 This aspect of Caperton demands that the Court give the 
due process concerns regarding recusal because of the lack of 
impartiality a second look in Williams-Yulee. The Court should be 
careful not to use the First Amendment to limit these “more rigorous 
standards” that a state enacts in its judicial ethics codes. To be sure, 
Canon 7C(1) would not have prevented the Caperton situation; there 
is seemingly no accusation that Brent Benjamin personally solicited 
the $3 million that Don Blankenship contributed to Benjamin’s 
campaign to be a justice on the state’s highest court. But Canon 7C(1) 
could act as a prophylactic to some of the forty open questions that 
Justice Roberts raised in his dissent. And to the extent that a decision 
in Williams-Yulee could provoke other First Amendment challenges to 
other judicial canons, the Court should be mindful of Caperton’s 
excess.29 
 
 25.  556 U.S. at 884. The Court continued, “The inquiry centers on the contribution’s 
relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total 
amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of 
the election.” Id.   
 26.  Id. at 902 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (stating that opening the door for such claims 
would “bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the 
American people in the fairness and integrity of their courts”).  
 27.  Id. at 896 (questions twenty-two and twenty-four). 
 28.  Id. at 889 (majority opinion). 
 29.  This is true notwithstanding the argument that the very excesses in Caperton, 
including Blankenship’s donation of almost $2.5 million to “And For The Sake Of The Kids,” a 
political organization formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527 to support Benjamin’s judicial candidacy, are 
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Additionally, Caperton is a reminder that pronounced 
inequality is at odds with judicial impartiality. The concern here is not 
only the appearance of judicial impartiality but the reality of implicit 
judicial bias.30 As Michele Benedetto Neitz has argued, because judges 
are members of an elite class who are more economically privileged 
than the “average individual litigant” appearing before them, “they 
may be unaware of the gaps between their own experiences and 
realities and those of poor people.”31 Indeed, our nation’s highest Court 
and the Court’s Bar have been increasingly criticized as elitist.32 But 
even in the so-called lowest courts, it is this implicit bias that puts 
public interest attorneys at a special risk for implicit bias. Our clients 
are usually already those who are very unlikely to share similar 
economic circumstances with our judges; and again, as public interest 
attorneys, we are less likely to be able to contribute to judicial 
campaigns, but may feel more likely to comply with a solicitation 
because we know our clients are already at a disadvantage. 
Additionally, our opposing clients and counsel are often those who are 
precisely in the position of being solicited and of answering those 
solicitations with substantial contributions. Courts may simply be 
institutions that can be expected to do no more than maintain the 
status quo. But the United States Supreme Court has, on occasion, 
intimated otherwise.  
 
attributable to United States Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 
F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating that the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), “resolves this appeal” and, in “accordance with that decision,” 
holding that the “contribution limits of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3) are 
unconstitutional as applied to individuals' contributions” to SpeechNow.org).  
 30.  For further discussions, see Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the 
Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 
1973–1984 (2010) (providing an overview and criticism of the “appearance standard” for judicial 
impartiality); Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification--
And a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to 
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 774–78 (2011) 
(discussing the current standards of recusal for economic interest and suggesting areas for 
improvement).   
 31.  Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
137, 141 (2013). 
 32.  See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts, & John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber: A Small 
Group of Lawyers and Its Outsized Influence at the U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS INVESTIGATES 
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/; Dahlia Lithwick, The 
2014 Supreme Court: An Ivy League Clan, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120173/2014-supreme-court-ivy-league-clan-disconnected-
reality, archived at http://perma.cc/GEF5-B8LL. 
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IV. SHELLEY V. KRAEMER33 
The 1948 landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer established that 
judicial actions are subject to the same Fourteenth Amendment 
strictures as legislative and executive actions. While Williams-Yulee 
does involve the Supreme Court of Florida imposing a judicial 
reprimand, it is not the state action doctrine that merits the Court’s 
consideration of Shelley v. Kraemer. Instead, Shelley v. Kraemer 
deserves a second look for its message about the responsibility of all 
courts—and all judges—to achieve equality. 
The Court in Shelley v. Kraemer held that the state court's 
enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant regarding the sale and 
ownership of private property constituted state action necessary to 
assert the constitutional claim. The Court rejected the view that the 
state judiciary was outside the Fourteenth Amendment because it was 
abstaining from action, merely applying settled common law, or 
merely enforcing a private agreement. The Court also rejected an 
insidious formal equality argument.34 
The power of Shelley v. Kraemer is highlighted in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., which synthesized the standard for state action and applied it to a 
preemptory challenge during voir dire in a civil case.35 In articulating 
the test to determine whether a particular actor could be considered a 
state actor, the Court cited Shelley—and Shelley alone—for its factor 
“whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the 
incidents of governmental authority.”36 In applying this factor, the 
Court stated that “the injury caused by the discrimination is made 
more severe because the government permits it to occur within the 
courthouse itself.” It continued: 
Few places are a more real expression of the constitutional authority of the government 
than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds. Within the courtroom, the government 
invokes its laws to determine the rights of those who stand before it. In full view of the 
public, litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries render verdicts, and 
judges act with the utmost care to ensure that justice is done.37 
This attention to the role of judges and courts in the actual 
work of doing justice is worth replicating in Williams-Yulee. It is 
 
 33.  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 34.  The Court did not accept the argument that the state courts were not violating the 
Equal Protection Clause because the “state courts stand ready to enforce restrictive covenants 
excluding white persons.” Id. at 21–22. 
 35.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 614–15 (1991).  
 36.  Id. at 622. 
 37.  Id. at 628. 
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related to the noteworthy recusal of three Justices in Shelley v. 
Kraemer. As the opinion recites, “Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice 
Jackson, and Mr. Justice Rutledge took no part in the consideration or 
decision of these cases.”38 The common understanding is that these 
Justices owned property with racially restrictive covenants, although 
not the property at issue in the case.39 It is difficult to imagine such 
recusals happening today given current practices.40 Yet such recusals 
deserve a second look in light of the standard set in Caperton and the 
vision of justice articulated in Shelley. 
For contemporary public interest attorneys, the option of 
judges recusing themselves because property they own might be less 
valuable if we prevail—as might be the case in a tenant strike in a 
small community—is relatively remote. Yet what is real is that, as 
litigators, we must believe in the ability of judges to be impartial and 
not to be biased against our clients or against us. And we want not to 
be placed in a position in which we feel we cannot “offend” a judge who 
will be making rulings. 
V. IN RE HAWKINS41 
About six months after the Supreme Court of Florida decided 
Williams-Yulee, it decided In re: Judith W. Hawkins and imposed the 
ultimate sanction in a judicial disciplinary proceeding: removal from 
the bench.42 A look—and then a second look—at In re Hawkins 
elucidates some of the concerns inherent in Williams-Yulee. 
The charges against Judge Hawkins, a county court judge, 
revolved around her role as the proprietor of Gaza Road Ministries, 
featuring her work as an inspirational speaker and author of the book 
 
 38.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 23.   
 39.  See, e.g., RICHARD KULGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 254 (1975) (stating that the most widely 
drawn inference from the recusal of Justices Jackson, Reed, and Rutledge was that they owned 
or occupied land subject to restrictive covenants); Leland B. Ware, Invisible Walls: An 
Examination of the Legal Strategy of the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 761 
(1989) (“Three of the nine Supreme Court Justices did not participate in the covenant cases 
decision. Justices Jackson, Reed and Rutledge recused themselves. No official reason was given 
but it was widely assumed that they lived in homes that were subject to restrictive covenants.”). 
 40.  See, e.g., James Sample, Supreme Court Recusal from Marbury to the Modern Day, 26 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 96–97 (2013) (arguing that while Chief Justice Roberts's “relatively 
bare assertion that when it comes to disqualification, the Supreme Court is simply 
constitutionally and pragmatically different . . . is neither emotionally nor intellectually 
satisfying, in an imperfect world, his argument is also entirely correct”).   
 41.  No. SC12–2495, 2014 WL 5470745 (Fla. Oct. 30, 2014), reh'g denied (Nov. 26, 2014). 
 42.  Id. at *14.  
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Old Stories, New Insights, which is based on biblical stories.43 Some of 
these charges, found to be true by the Hearing Panel and affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Florida, involved Judge Hawkins’s selling of her 
book. She “sold a book to an attorney appearing before her in open 
court who had asked her about the book and requested a copy”; she 
“accepted $15 for a copy of the book at that time.”44 The Hearing Panel 
also found: 
Another attorney testified that he had a conversation with Judge Hawkins in the 
courthouse hallway in which she mentioned that she had a book for sale, which the 
attorney purchased although he was not really interested in the subject. He testified he 
did not want to offend the judge.45 
Additionally, the court stated that “Hawkins testified at the hearing 
that three or four attorneys bought her book, as well as some judicial 
assistants, some court administration personnel, a judge, two bailiffs, 
an employee in the probation department, and some court clerks.”46 
There was little certainty about the number of books Judge Hawkins 
sold and the court found she was not forthcoming with this 
information.47 
Judge Hawkins’s infractions were not limited to the actual 
sales of her books: she may have been actively dishonest as well as not 
forthcoming; she did not pay taxes on the books; and she may have 
been using state property and personnel to promote her 
business/ministry.48 But Judge Hawkins’s book sales were a keystone 
of the charges against her for judicial misconduct. The book-selling 
 
 43.  Id. at *2. For the Gaza Road Ministries website, see GAZA ROAD MINISTRIES, 
http://www.gazaroadministries.com/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SD2H-ZSW2. 
 44. Hawkins, 2014 WL 5470745, at *7. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at *11.  
 47.  As the court stated: 
She did not know all the names of those to whom she sold the book, and defended her 
noncompliance with the order to compel a complete list of purchasers by saying she 
was under no obligation to create anything, but just to provide what information she 
had. This conflicted with her earlier statements to the Investigative Panel that she 
kept a “fairly meticulous list” of those persons to whom she sold the book. 
Id.  
 48.  Id. at *5, *7–8. The Florida Supreme Court’s specific discussion of the work Judge 
Hawkins’s judicial assistant may have done on Gaza Road Ministries raises the specter of the 
assistant’s ability to complain about this work and remain protected from negative employment 
consequences. Id. at *7. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the Court held that a 
prosecutor did not have First Amendment protection when he disagreed with his supervisors 
about possible police misconduct because such statements were “pursuant to his official duties.” 
Id. at 411. Importantly, while the Court may have expanded First Amendment protections for 
those seeking elected office, in the same time period it can be seen to have constricted First 
Amendment rights for public employees. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Whistleblowing, Public 
Employees, and the First Amendment, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 975, 997 (2013). 
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charges, as well as the charge that she posted an image of herself 
wearing her robe on the Gaza Road Ministries website,49 are amenable 
to First Amendment defenses, although Judge Hawkins seemingly 
failed to raise constitutional issues. 
But suppose Judge Hawkins had raised a First Amendment 
defense grounded in both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, 
given the content of both the book and the website. Assuming her 
litigation were ongoing, one can imagine that she would be eagerly 
awaiting the Court’s decision in Williams-Yulee. To the extent that the 
Court in Williams-Yulee acknowledges judicial impartiality as a state 
interest—even a compelling one—but finds that Canon 7C(1) is not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored, it would lend credence to Hawkins’s 
First Amendment speech claim. Perhaps there would be an argument 
that Williams-Yulee would be limited to the context of judicial 
elections, but the Court’s decision in Republican Party v. White has 
 
 49.  I have discussed the question of judicial robe-wearing as expression covered by the 
First Amendment in RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY 97–100 (2013). While 
many of the issues involve judges appearing wearing robes in their campaign literature—an 
issue most similar to that in Williams-Yulee and in disarray—the case most relevant to a First 
Amendment claim by Judge Hawkins is Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007). In 
Jenevin, the Fifth Circuit partially expunged the censure of a Texas judge by the state’s 
commission on judicial ethics “to the extent that it reached beyond” the judge’s “use of the 
courtroom and his robe to send his message.” Id. at 562. As part of contentious litigation in 2003 
that spawned allegations of bribes, favors, and sexual misconduct, Judge Jenevein held a press 
conference in the courtroom—and importantly, wore his judicial robe—to announce his 
withdrawal from the case and his institution of grievance proceedings against the attorney who 
had made the allegations. Id. at 553–54. The attorney, however, filed a grievance against Judge 
Jenevein for holding the press conference, and the state commission issued a censure against the 
judge, without addressing the First Amendment defenses the judge had raised. Id. at 555–56. 
Judge Jenevein thereafter brought an action in federal court challenging the constitutionality of 
the censure. Id. at 557. The Fifth Circuit held that while the judge was indeed an employee, the 
First Amendment doctrine governing government employee speech by emphasizing the divide 
between matters of public and private concern was inapposite. Id. at 557–58. Instead, the court 
applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 558. Considering whether judicial impartiality was a compelling 
governmental interest, the court held that it could not be gainsaid that the “state's interest in 
achieving a courtroom that at least on entry of its robed judge becomes a neutral and 
disinterested temple” was compelling. Id. at 559. The state’s compelling interest extended to the 
“judicial use of the robe, which symbolically sets aside the judge’s individuality and passions.” Id. 
at 560. On the issue of whether the censure was narrowly tailored, the court had more difficulty 
separating the content of the judicial statements from their environment. Id. at 562. The court 
found the judge’s use of the “trappings of his judicial office to boost his message,” particularly 
“stepping out from behind the bench, while wearing his judicial robe, to address the cameras,” 
could constitutionally support a censure. Id. at 560. In a limited victory for the state judge, 
however, the court ruled that the content of the statements could not be constitutionally 
censured. Id. at 562. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the judge was publicly addressing abuse 
of process, that the communication was between the judge and “his constituents,” and that it was 
on a matter of “judicial administration” rather than the merits of a case. Id. at 560. See ROBSON, 
supra, at 99.  
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not been so limited.50 Or one might seek to distinguish In re Hawkins 
because Judge Hawkins sold her book in “open court” and in the 
courthouse hallways, and the Court has certainly recognized severe 
limitations on the First Amendment in the context of its own Supreme 
Court building.51 Nevertheless, the potential of the Court’s decision in 
Williams-Yulee to invalidate a range of judicial canons and their 
applications needs careful consideration. While “slippery slope,” 
“parade of horribles,” and “line-drawing” rhetoric can be misused in 
legal reasoning, the Court in Williams-Yulee should take a look—and 
a second look—at In re Hawkins. 
From the perspective of public interest attorneys practicing in 
Hawkins’s county court, the vulnerability of our clients would make 
the refusal to buy Judge Hawkins’s book risky. This is true even if—
and perhaps especially if—one imagined Judge Hawkins might be 
otherwise well-disposed towards our clients.52 Moreover, the religious 
nature of Judge Hawkins’s book not only enhances her First 
Amendment claim, it also makes the possibility of coercion more 
pronounced. Like the attorney who testified he did not want to 
“offend” the judge and so bought the book, it would be difficult to 
decline the $15 purchase. Certainly the courthouse hallway adds to 
the problem, but I daresay that if I had been at a social engagement 
with Judge Hawkins—say, a Halloween party—I would have been 
squeamish when presented with the book. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In addition to the four cases I have suggested deserve a “second 
look”—Republican Party of Minnesota v. White; Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co.; Shelley v. Kraemer; and In re Hawkins—the Court 
 
 50.  For example, the Fifth Circuit in Jenevein, discussed supra at note 49, cited and quoted 
White. See, e.g., Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 559. 
 51.  See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183–84 (1983); Ruthann Robson, Occupy 
Jacket-Wearer Arrested at Supreme Court Building, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 21, 2012), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2012/01/occupy-jacket-wearer-arrested-at-supreme-
court-building.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H4X8-MDXT; Ruthann Robson, The First 
Amendment and the Supreme Court - - - Building, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/10/the-first-amendment-and-the-supreme-court-
building.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8Y39-LLWH. 
 52.  For example, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion contains a suggestion that Judge 
Hawkins might have been sympathetic to criminal defendants who were not represented: 
Judge Hawkins was found not guilty of the charge that her actions in advising a 
defendant, who was about to enter a plea, to contact one of three named lawyers and 
tell them “Judge Hawkins sent you” failed to promote public confidence in the 
judiciary. 
 In re Hawkins, 2014 WL 5470745, at *6. 
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will undoubtedly take a look at the circuit court cases that have split 
on the issue of First Amendment protections for candidates seeking 
election to the judiciary. Yet in considering these cases, the Supreme 
Court of Florida’s not-so-subtle comment that federal judges have 
unelected positions with lifetime appointments is worth more than 
passing attention.53 It is especially noteworthy as compared with the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s conclusion that “every state supreme court 
that has examined the constitutionality of comparable state judicial 
ethics canons has concluded that these types of provisions are 
constitutional, as one of a constellation of provisions designed to 
ensure that judges engaged in campaign activities are able to 
maintain their status as fair and impartial arbiters of the law.”54 The 
Court’s own status as an elite institution in a federalist system merits 
a careful self-examination. 
Additionally, a hard look at practicing attorneys—and as I 
have suggested, public interest and social justice attorneys—is 
warranted, if perhaps unlikely. Yet when one circuit court opines that 
“[n]o one could reasonably believe that a failure to respond to a signed 
mass mailing asking for donations would result in unfair treatment in 
future dealings with the judge,”55 I wonder about the concept of a 
“mass mailing”—especially in a small legal community—just as I 
wonder about the concepts of reasonable belief and unfair treatment. 
Perhaps I am overly squeamish. 
But perhaps it is practicing lawyers—and most of all social 
justice lawyers—rather than an undifferentiated public who need to 
believe that those who judge our cases and clients do so with the most 
impartiality humanly possible. We should not have to worry whether 
they think we “support” them, or whether our adversaries “support” 
them. We should not have to curry favor through financial 
contributions directly requested by a person who is hearing our 
 
 53.  Footnote 3 of the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion in Williams-Yulee reads: 
As to the federal courts that have considered this issue—whose judges have lifetime 
appointments and thus do not have to engage in fundraising—the federal courts are 
split. Several federal courts have held that laws similar to Canon 7C(1) are 
constitutional. See Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir.2012); Bauer v. Shepard, 
620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir.2010); Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir.2010); Stretton 
v. Disciplinary Bd. of S.Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.1991). Conversely, other 
federal courts have held that laws similar to Canon 7C(1) are unconstitutional. See 
Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir.2010); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 
(11th Cir.2002). 
Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 138 So. 3d 379, 387 n.3 (Fla.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 
(2014). 
 54.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 386.  
 55.  Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 205 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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clients’ causes. To do our work, we must continue to have faith that 
our judges, whether elected or whether appointed to the United States 
Supreme Court, are not mere politicians. 
 
